The U.S. Supreme Court addressed government’s various roles with respect to speech on social media in five cases reviewed in its recently completed term. The through-line of these cases is a critically important principle that sets limits on government’s ability to control the online speech of people who use social media, as well as the social media sites themselves: internet users’ First Amendment rights to speak on social media—whether by posting or commenting—may be infringed by the government if it interferes with content moderation, but will not be infringed by the independent decisions of the platforms themselves.
As a general overview, the NetChoice cases, Moody v. NetChoice and NetChoice v. Paxton, looked at government’s role as a regulator of social media platforms. The issue was whether state laws in Texas and Florida that prevented certain online services from moderating content were constitutional in most of their possible applications. The Supreme Court did not rule on that question and instead sent the cases back to the lower courts to reexamine NetChoice’s claim that the statutes had few possible constitutional applications.
The court did, importantly and correctly, explain that at least Facebook’s Newsfeed and YouTube’s Homepage were examples of platforms exercising their own First Amendment rights on how to display and organize content, and the laws could not be constitutionally applied to Newsfeed and Homepage and similar sites, a preliminary step in determining whether the laws were facially unconstitutional.
Lindke v. Freed and Garnier v. O’Connor-Ratcliffe looked at the government’s role as a social media user who has an account and wants to use its full features, including blocking other users and deleting comments. The Supreme Court instructed the lower courts to first look to whether a government official has the authority to speak on behalf of the government, before looking at whether the official used their social media page for governmental purposes, conduct that would trigger First Amendment protections for the commenters.
Murthy v. Missouri, the jawboning case, looked at the government’s mixed role as a regulator and user, in which the government may be seeking to coerce platforms to engage in unconstitutional censorship or may also be a user simply flagging objectionable posts as any user might. The Supreme Court found that none of the plaintiffs had standing to bring the claims because they could not show that their harms were traceable to any action by the federal government defendants.
We’ve analyzed each of the Supreme Court decisions, Moody v. NetChoice (decided with NetChoice v. Paxton), Murthy v. Missouri, and Lindke v. Freed (decided with Garnier v. O’Connor Ratcliffe), in depth.
But some common themes emerge when all five cases are considered together.
- Internet users have a First Amendment right to speak on social media—whether by posting or commenting—and that right may be infringed when the government seeks to interfere with content moderation, but it will not be infringed by the independent decisions of the platforms themselves. This principle, which EFF has been advocating for many years, is evident in each of the rulings. In Lindke, the Supreme Court recognized that government officials, if vested with and exercising official authority, could violate the First Amendment by deleting a user’s comments or blocking them from commenting altogether. In Murthy, the Supreme Court found that users could not sue the government for violating their First Amendment rights unless they could show that government coercion lead to their content being taken down or obscured, rather than the social media platform’s own editorial decision. And in the NetChoice cases, the Supreme Court explained that social media platforms typically exercise their own protected First Amendment rights when they edit and curate which posts they show to their users, and the government may violate the First Amendment when it requires them to publish or amplify posts.
- Underlying these rulings is the Supreme Court’s long-awaited recognition that social media platforms routinely moderate users’ speech: they decide which posts each user sees and when and how they see it, they decide to amplify and recommend some posts and obscure others, and are often guided in this process by their own community standards or similar editorial policies. This is seen in the Supreme Court’s emphasis in Murthy that jawboning is not actionable if the content moderation was the independent decision of the platform rather than coerced by the government. And a similar recognition of independent decision-making underlies the Supreme Court’s First Amendment analysis in the NetChoice cases. The Supreme Court has now thankfully moved beyond the idea that content moderation is largely passive and indifferent, a concern that had been raised after the Supreme Court used that language to describe the process in last term’s case, Twitter v. Taamneh.
- This term’s cases also confirm that traditional First Amendment rules apply to social media. In Lindke, the Supreme Court recognized that when government controls the comments components of a social media page, it has the same First Amendment obligations to those who wish to speak in those spaces as it does in offline spaces it controls, such as parks, public auditoriums, or city council meetings. In the NetChoice cases, the Supreme Court found that platforms that edit and curate user speech according to their editorial standards have the same First Amendment rights as others who express themselves by selecting the speech of others, including art galleries, booksellers, newsstands, parade organizers, and editorial page editors.
Plenty of legal issues around social media remain to be decided. But the 2023-24 Supreme Court term has set out important speech-protective rules that will serve as the foundation for many future rulings.
This post was originally published on here
