Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania await the presidential election in the United States with anxiety. With the politicisation of US support for Ukraine and Donald Trump’s questioning of NATO’s mutual-defence obligation, the future of European and transatlantic security seems at stake for the three Baltic countries.
Bordering Russia and constantly subjected to its threats, few alliance members are as exposed to the consequences of a transatlantic rift as Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
Their security dependence on the United States shapes their thinking on the election. While some other countries consider how to ‘Trump-proof’ NATO, they emphasise their commitment to working with whoever is elected.
The three Baltic countries recognize that the United States’ role in Europe is and will keep changing regardless of the result, due to its intensifying systemic rivalry with China and growing focus on the Indo-Pacific.
At the same time, most Baltic officials hope that the country’s democratic institutions and government bureaucracy will constrain the next president in making radical policy changes. For them, the key impact will be on the evolution of the ongoing shift in transatlantic relations and how this is managed in Washington.
The critical test will be Ukraine. While President Joe Biden’s early leadership in responding to Russia’s invasion confirmed that the United States is indispensable, they have found his risk-averse approach ultimately disappointing. Former and current Baltic officials have recently signed an open letter urging Biden to “not tarnish his legacy” by restricting the use of Western weapons against targets inside Russia and by failing to supply Kyiv with additional arms.
When it comes to Ukraine, the Baltic countries want not only to “keep the Americans in” but also to see it shift to seeking “peace through strength”.
It is uncertain whether either candidate would do so. Kamala Harris has repeated the pledge of the administration of which she is part to stand with Ukraine “as long as it takes” and criticised Donald Trump for being ready to pressure Kyiv to negotiate with Moscow. Yet her campaign has been vague on a Ukraine strategy. Likely members of her administration, such as Phil Gordon, would be expected to also favour a careful, pragmatic approach.
By contrast, some in the Baltic countries believe that Trump’s aggressive approach to deal-making means that his administration might ramp up pressure on Russia in seeking the quick end to the war he has talked about.
This, however, is predicated on there being such-minded officials in his administration—for example, Mike Pompeo and Robert O’Brien—and ignores concerns about Trump’s ability to follow through on actions after any negotiated peace would inevitably require. More fundamentally, this relies on faith in Trump’s commitment to US allies—or to his own words. The likelier scenario is that Ukraine would simply be put under pressure rather than empowered.
‘Keep the Americans in’
In terms of European security, the Baltic countries seek to “keep the Americans in” while recognising its shifting priorities.
They do so by supporting it within and beyond NATO. Within the alliance, they amplify Washington’s demands that European members should contribute more, and they emphasise that their defence spending reaches well above the required two per cent of GDP and that they contribute most to support Ukraine relative to the size of their economies.
They also plan to build on existing regional cooperation mechanisms, such as the Baltic Security Initiative Act, and to leverage their ties with larger European allies. This is the case with Lithuania’s intention to establish a 2+1 framework with Germany and the United States, given the planned deployment of a German brigade in the country.
The Baltic governments also seek to keep the United States attentive to their needs by supporting it in constraining China’s global assertiveness. While Lithuania has been the most vocal in this, pursuing close ties with Taiwan and at times a hardline decoupling agenda, all three countries have taken measures to address economic dependence and technology risks with regard to China.
They have also pushed the rest of the EU to do the same; for example, by withdrawing from the 17+1 cooperation format with China and voting in favour of tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles. Showing their alignment with the United States is not the only reason for this stance (for example, Beijing’s support for Russia is a critical source of tension), but this consideration is more or less explicit in their decision-making.
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania hope that this approach will win them favour with any US administration. Yet, while they may adjust to Trump’s transactionalism, he would surely seek again to pressure European countries on burden-sharing and to pursue an aggressive trade policy toward the EU, which would be highly problematic for them. By contrast, they expect that Harris would fulfil her promise of continuity in commitment to NATO and engagement in Europe.
Constructive cooperation would be much likelier under Harris
The Baltic countries’ ability to make their case also depends on reaching the right audience in Washington. They are familiar and have enjoyed close relations with the transatlanticist and neoconservative networks there but have made limited inroads with the more isolationist elements of the Trump coalition or with the “pragmatic internationalists” in Harris’s orbit.
Baltic figures occupying senior relevant EU posts—Kaja Kallas as EU’s top diplomat, Andrius Kubilius as defense commissioner, and Jovita Neliupšienė as EU ambassador to the United States—may help in this regard.
While they agree with Washington on limiting the risks in economic relations with geopolitical adversaries like China, the Baltic countries are also wary of a turn to protectionism in the United States, not least because it could embolden protectionists in the EU.
At the same time, some hope the three countries could benefit from Washington’s emphasis on nearshoring, but there are concerns as to how attractive they would be to US investors. Their preferred solution would be a transatlantic free trade area, but this would remain out of reach under Harris or Trump.
Their fallback position has been to support frameworks that help stabilise and coordinate EU and US positions, such as the Trade and Technology Council launched in 2021. Here, constructive cooperation would be much likelier under Harris than Trump, given the latter’s threats to impose a global tariff and propensity to apply economic pressure on the EU.
In sum, the Baltic governments would prefer a carefully managed process for the evolution of the transatlantic relationship that gives European countries time to build up their defence capacities and does not disrupt mutually beneficial cooperation.
This may also explain the clear preference for Harris among the Baltic publics, which believe that she would be better for the United States’ global clout. These two factors suggest that the Baltic capitals hope for a Harris victory, even if they will seek productive cooperation with either winner and see neither as a panacea.
This article is part of series in which German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) experts from Central and Eastern Europe set out the implications of a Harris or Trump win in the US presidential election for the countries in the region.
This post was originally published on here
