On Nov. 5, millions of Americans gathered at polling stations to vote for the next president of the United States. While this should have been a straightforward electoral process, what transpired led to numerous problems and concerns.
During 2024’s US presidential election, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) announced that several bomb threats had been made to polling stations across the United States. Election volunteers and local authorities were ordered to help voters to safety, and numerous polling areas were evacuated.
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These potential threats disrupted the voting process at dozens of polling stations in Georgia, Wisconsin, Michigan, and Arizona. Some voters who had not cast their ballots chose not to return to the voting areas because of the incident.
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As the bomb threats came in, the FBI quickly investigated the matter. They soon determined that not only were the threats made to the polling locations not credible but had originated from Russian domains and intended to disrupt the election voting process.
Russia’s attempts did not end there. On election day, the FBI discovered that “its name and insignia [had been] misused to promote false narratives [on social media during] the election.”
The bureau found several cases where videos and images were posted on social media, including X and TikTok, that falsely attributed the content to the FBI. The videos and photos falsely claimed that voters were being bribed and blackmailed by election volunteers to vote for particular candidates as they cast their ballots.
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Another set of videos, also falsely attributed to the FBI, said it had found cases of ballot fraud and instances where voting machines had been rigged at poll booths – implying that the election results had been stolen. These posts, among others, were reposted many times on social media platforms, including X, in an attempt to stir up US voters.
In another approach to try an undermine confidence in the election results, Russian propagandists impersonated US voters claiming that they would vote several times – it is illegal to cast multiple ballots in the same election. Other videos that claimed that ballots cast for former president Donald Trump had been destroyed were widely promoted and shared on X.
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Unfortunately, little was done to stop the spread of such disinformation. The Center for Countering Digital Hate found that X’s crowdsourced fact-checking tool had failed to combat rampant misinformation on its platform, allowing false content intended to influence the thoughts and opinions of American voters to go unchecked.
“Election integrity is among our highest priorities,” the FBI said in relation to the fabricated videos and images. “Attempts to deceive the [US] public with false content about FBI threat assessments and activities aim to undermine our democratic process and erode trust in the electoral system.”
The events on November’s election day should be treated seriously. While US government agencies should do everything they can to investigate these matters, they should have been better prepared.
Two months before the presidential election, the Biden administration announced that it had reason to believe that the Russian Federation would seek to undermine the electoral process in the United States. US Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco said the government had learned that “three Russian companies used fake profiles to promote false [election] narratives on social media.”
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The US Attorney General Merrick Garland added that Russian state media programs had produced “online content aimed at sowing divisions among Americans.” He added that “hidden Russian government messaging” had sought to mislead the US public through social media ahead of the 2024 presidential election.
Following these announcements, the FBI and the US Department of Justice (DOJ) informed the Trump and Harris campaigns that they would be targeted by a “foreign actor influence operation” ahead of the election. Despite these warnings, little was done to address these issues.
Commenting on election interference, Senator Mark Warner told National Public Radio that “barriers to entry [in the US] for foreign malign influence have unfortunately become incredibly small.”
Meanwhile, Senator Marco Rubio questioned how the US intelligence community had prepared to combat foreign election interference ahead of the presidential election. He argued that the United States should do everything possible to “protect the credibility” of the US electoral process. Still, little was being done to address the seriousness of these matters.
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In response, the FBI announced that it had seized dozens of domains on social media, many of which were Kremlin-backed. The bureau also deactivated several social media accounts that spread disinformation. Despite these efforts, several other accounts on the X and TikTok social media platforms among others, posted content that influenced the US public ahead of the election.
How did the Russians use social media to spread disinformation and misinformation before the 2024 U.S. presidential election? In addition, who was their target audience?
“From mid-June to early November 2024, we observed an uptick in pro-Russian accounts that were posting content related to the U.S. presidential election,” said Benjamin Shultz, a researcher at the American Sunlight Project.
Interviewed for this article, Shultz said, “a number of distinct networks, amplifying overt Russian propaganda, posted misleading information on social media accounts to try and influence voters ahead of the election. They were attempting to impersonate grassroots support for viewpoints across the political spectrum, including on the left, and these accounts saw large engagement with users online.”
“Then, after the election, many of these accounts went silent,” Shultz added. “Based on this activity, it can be inferred that these accounts were created to target specific segments of the US population to try and influence opinions ahead of the election.”
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This was not the only operation that originated in Russia. Aside from creating accounts that portrayed left-wing activists, the DOJ noted that Russian accounts also sought to influence the far-right on social media platforms.
According to the Associated Press, various right-wing influencers on social media were funded by Russian state media to promote disinformation about the election. Throughout the 2024 election cycle, these social media influencers promoted politically charged information about the election process aimed at influencing US voters. Given the source of funding these influencers received, the DOJ concluded that this was another attempt by the Russian Federation to interfere in the US electoral process.
The role of social media during the electoral process changed. According to surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center, about 20 percent of the American public uses social media platforms as their primary news source. According to its findings, Pew said that one in five Americans had relied on content posted by social media influencers to become more informed about the 2024 presidential election.
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In this instance, many of the accounts referenced were platforms that shared misinformation about the candidates, the political climate in the US, and its electoral process. Millions of Americans were exposed to accounts that promoted factually incorrect information, thus influencing their thoughts and opinions ahead of the electoral process.
Russian disinformation on social media accounts during the election seems to have been effective. How can Congress, US agencies, and the American public counter future Russian disinformation campaigns on social media?
These strategies will be addressed in a subsequent article.
Mark Temnycky is an accredited freelance journalist covering Eurasian affairs and a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.
The views expressed are the author’s and not necessarily of Kyiv Post.
This post was originally published on here