By Maj Gen Jagatbir Singh, VSM (Retd)
New Delhi, 25th December 2024: General’s Jottings by Lieutenant General KJ Singh who retired as the Western Army Commander is an updated and distilled collection of his columns and articles published in various newspapers and journals addressing contemporary issues. The columns bear all the hallmarks; they are direct, sharp, incisive, and brief yet cover all important aspects of the subject.
This compilation includes longer articles published in Year Books of the United Service Institution of India (USI), Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) and Gyanchakra amongst others. This book weaves the articles thematically. Important issues have been highlighted, and key takeaway points have been duly flagged. Necessary updates to articles have also been done, along with an indication of the time of writing for better referencing. Most importantly these articles have been compiled with rare commitment.
About the Book
The book has been divided into nineteen sections each self-contained yet inter connected which helps the reader dive into any of the sections and navigate these subjects independently. A potpourri of themes which include an Analysis of India’s Borders, its neighbourhood, the military threats to include both the two front threat and the challenges on the Western Border, details about the Pakistani Army, Afghanistan – Pakistan region and of course the Indus Water Treaty. The author has also covered China in great detail to include a brilliant piece on the significance of the Siliguri Corridor. In addition, issues such as the proxy war in J&K and the insurgency in the North East have all been covered in great detail.
While carrying out an ‘Analytical Mapping of Trends in Unending Conflicts’; General KJ Singh has stated that, it will be pragmatic for nations to avoid belligerence and application of kinetic force. Even if forced into it, it will be prudent to stipulate realistic goals with a clearly defined end-state. It is also axiomatic to build interim exit options for conflict termination. He states that ‘Long, drawn-out conflicts with indeterminate objectives are more likely to be the new normal in future. In addition, conflicts are likely to degenerate into extended hybrid wars/insurgencies.
While giving out the Agenda for Modi 3.0 the author has stated that ‘funding for defence modernization be liberated from the self-defeating 2% GDP ceiling.’ And, that each border is unique, and it will be pragmatic to group all forces, including CAPFs and agencies in theatre, under a designated Theatre Commander. The unique eco-system of Services needs to be respected and tinkering in name of transformation is avoidable.
He states that taking heed from emerging trends, India has embarked on multiple measures to cope up with multi-spectral challenges. The major initiatives include, rebalancing deployment to boost force level on the Northern Front opposite China. Accelerating the push towards theatrisation and transformation. Expediting the building of border infrastructure and pushing for Atam-Nirbharata (self-reliance) and modernisation. Revising ammunition stocking level and opening armament and ammunition manufacturing to private entities.
Regarding China, General KJ Singh has stated that ‘unresolved borders between two powerful neighbours, both armed with nuclear weapons and in aspirational trajectory, have the potential for conflict, given their acrimonious history. It is axiomatic that both settle the boundary dispute on priority. The CBMs and protocols have become meaningless due to the unilateral actions of the PLA. ‘
He goes on to state that ‘the coping strategy in dealing with China must factor in existing asymmetry and should be confined within the bounds of realism. We have viable options, though limited, yet we must signal resolve. To deter the Red Dragon, we must discard myths, accept new realities, and reduce asymmetries. China is indeed the biggest adversary, and the only antidote is capability-building’.
Clearly bringing out the fact that ‘we must be cognizant that heavy lifting is our burden and external assistance from groupings like QUAD would be limited. QUAD, itself is creating complementary groupings like AUKUS and I-5. There is growing parallel engagement with Japan and South Korea with India being pushed to periphery’.
The author while discussing the ‘Two Front Threat’ has stated that the CPEC is a new collusive paradigm. Collusion has been accepted as a corollary and reality. Collusion in many facets like intelligence, info operations, cyber, surveillance, manufacturing, preparation, and many more disciplines has acquired abiding permanency and seamless fusion between the two nations.’ He then states in a scenario where all three players are armed with nuclear weapons, the need is to build genuine CBMs, more transparency, and reduce collusion’.
Writing about Pakistan he clearly brings out the primacy of the Army and how it chose to make the anti-India bias its raison d’être. He then gives a very interesting scan of the Pakistani Chiefs bringing out that the three Chiefs who owed their origins to India namely Zia ul Haq from Jullunder, Aslam Beg from Azamgarh and Musharraf from Delhi tried to be more Punjabi than the Punjabi.
As a result, Zia led Pakistan to the path of Islamisation and its Army to new ideological frontiers, while under Aslam Beg the proxy war in Kashmir started and of course Kargil was initiated by Musharraf. Today General Munir a Shia is also seen as a minority.
He states that Pakistan has tried to offset its asymmetry by cultivating a nuanced irrationality wherein it threatens to transition from hybrid war to the tactical nuclear domain with a declaratory policy, as described by C Christine Fair, ‘Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are India-specific.’ And that the ’Pakistan Army, specifically at the higher echelons, it is not a pushover but has a considerable professional framework’.
While analyzing Pakistan’s National Security Policy, the author states ‘that India should also finalise its National Security Policy. The current reliance on ambiguity makes defence planning difficult. Without clear-cut goals, we deny ourselves the benefits of accountability and net assessment, which contribute to strategic deterrence.’
He also states that Pakistan geo-strategic location keeps it relevant for the major powers, and they are likely to bail it out for their own great game. But its fancy notion of strategic depth through subservient Afghanistan under the Taliban now lies in tatters. In this uneasy triad of Pakistan, Taliban, and TTP, dangers of consolidation of the Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand line, with fatal consequences for Pakistan, are imminent.
Regarding the surgical strikes at Balakot , General KJ Singh has clearly brought out that’ the aerial capability has existed and been considered but, unfortunately, never exercised. It is to the credit of the government that they displayed political will with attendant risks—political and operational’.
He states that despite the Northern Front being designated as the primary one, challenges on the Western Front remain in both proxy war and conventional domains. But he also highlights that given our current state of equipment and ammunition inventory, we seem to lack the decisive edge and the requisite force asymmetry for a full-scale conventional war.
The proxy war has created two distinct response paradigms against Pakistan. The Northern Command is engaged in tackling challenges of terrorism, while the other forces on the Western Front, and even Northern Command, to an extent, are geared up for conventional warfare. The way forward is speedy conflict termination in J&K, backed up by effective punitive surgical strike capability.
In the long run, he states ‘we have to further refine our surgical strike capability to make it more lethal, precise, and remote. There is also an inescapable requirement to address ‘hollowness’ to regain a punitive edge in conventional forces to resuscitate the proactive (cold start) strategy. A full spectrum approach with concurrent options is indeed long overdue in J&K’.
Regarding the Indus Water Treaty, he says that ‘the threat of the revocation of the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) really amounts to playing to the gallery, as we must first create reservoirs to store water’.
Conclusion
Undoubtedly, a treasure trove of articles and essays backed by wonderful maps ‘General’s Jottings’ helps the reader understand the essence of National Security and Defence Studies. While many may question the relevance of entering this domain the truth is that today national security is all encompassing. The revised paradigm is that national security entails a ‘whole of nation’ approach. The lines between a civilian and combatant is increasingly blurred and hence it is imperative to understand both the drivers and nuances of some of the issues that are driving our challenges in this domain.
What stands out is the clarity and simplicity in which General KJ Singh has written this outstanding book on this very complex subject covering contemporary aspects of our national security and our neighbourhood. He also has the knack of connecting with his readership in an unintimidating manner. Incidentally, the first part starts with an acronym on how to navigate national security; LED PAL. (Location, Economy, Demography, Past History, Alliances and Leadership).
Having held coveted appointments at the highest level in the Armed Forces General KJ Singh has had a ring side view of national security and the insights offered by him are backed by his scholarship, professionalism and experience. Hence this book is strongly recommended to be read by academicians, students, scholars and practitioners. The book gives a rare insight into the problems are being encountered by the country and with an originality and prescriptive analysis that triggers some thinking. It is no doubt an invaluable companion.
This post was originally published on here
