Western politicians have repeatedly called on China to limit or cease tacit support for Russia’s bloody war against Ukraine. In response, China’s leadership insists it is committed to peace and respect for the territorial integrity of other nations.
But unlike most United Nations member states, China has never condemned Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and their military-diplomatic partnership — from joint bomber flights near the U.S. state of Alaska to votes in the U.N. Security Council — has only helped the Kremlin overcome its international isolation.
While President Donald Trump has said he has good personal relations with both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping, there is a consensus among experts in Washington that the China-Russia partnership poses a threat to U.S. interests, and that while Trump’s predecessor, Joe Biden, tried to establish a strategic dialogue with China, the Trump team appears to be prioritizing normalized ties with Russia while punishing China over trade.
As the White House talks about the possibility of restoring economic cooperation with Russia, some of its officials are hinting at lifting or reducing the sanctions Washington has imposed on Moscow in recent years.
Charles Hecker, an expert on Western-Russian economic ties and risks, and author of the book Zero Sum: The Arc of International Business in Russia, says some Western companies will quickly return to Russia if sanctions are lifted, particularly those involved in energy, metals and minerals.
“There’s only so much oil in Norway, and there’s only so much oil in Canada; the rest of it is in some countries that have a very high-risk environment,” Hecker told VOA’s Russian Service. “And so, these kinds of companies are accustomed to business in these sorts of places, and they have the internal structures to help protect them. You know, there are energy companies doing business in Iraq right now. And I don’t want to compare Russia and Iraq, but they are high-risk environments.”
Still, Hecker cautions, their return to doing business in Russia wouldn’t signal an overall U.S.-Russian rapprochement — let alone a fracturing of Sino-Russian relations.
“I think it will be very difficult for the West to pull Russia away from China,” he said.
“Allowing Western companies back into Russia doesn’t necessarily change President Putin’s hostility towards the West. President Putin remains antagonistic towards a Western-dominated political and economic system, and he has said over and over again that he wants to create an alternative political and economic environment – an alternative to the West.
“Part of that alternative includes China,” he added. “You have never heard President Putin say anything ideologically against China. And the two are now important energy partners.”
Limited popular domestic appeal
U.S.-based FilterLabs analyzes public sentiment in regions where polling is problematic. According to a recently published assessment of popular attitudes expressed on Russian and Chinese social media networks, Sino-Russian relations are “full of underlying tensions, mistrust, and diverging interests.”
One of the report’s authors, Vasily Gatov, told VOA its research found that “the Chinese and Russian populations are far from happy with this alliance of their authorities.”
“China does not perceive Russia as a reliable, safe and equal partner,” he said. “Russia annexed the Amur Region from China; Russia adopted a completely colonial policy towards China during the 19th and early 20th centuries. Therefore, in my opinion, it is entirely possible to consider historical frictions as a vulnerability.”
A media analyst at the University of Southern California’s Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism, Gatov also noted that, despite the Kremlin’s expectations, China’s economic presence inside Russia today remains “several times smaller” than that of either Europe or the U.S. before Russia invaded Ukraine.
Thus, while Russian and China have overlapping interests, they are not “marching in lockstep.”
“They are very different, they have very different geopolitical focuses, very different political philosophies,” he said.
Other experts, however, question the Filterlabs findings, warning that random Russian and Chinese opinions online are of limited value, especially as those casting the insights aren’t likely to influence policy.
“People who have the time and desire to comment on things on social media do not have much influence on how state policy is conducted,” Alexander Gabuev, director of the Berlin-based Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, told VOA. “And these people certainly do not have much influence on whether China transfers components for Russia’s weapons or takes certain military technologies from it, since the people who comment on this simply do not have real knowledge of what is actually happening.”
Gabuev added that “the Chinese leadership has reasons to think that they have something to take from Russia in terms of military technology,” suggesting that China is extremely interested in gaining Russian experience in countering Western weapons during Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Does Trump see China as a threat?
One critical question about whether Washington’s improved ties with Russia will loosen the Sino-Russian pact, say some analysts, is how Trump perceives China.
Ali Wyne, senior research and advocacy advisor on the U.S. and China at the International Crisis Group, describes Trump as an anomaly for U.S. policy.
“Widespread bipartisan agreement in Congress and from one administration to the next [is] that China is American’s foremost strategic competitor,” he said. But “President Trump, in many ways, is the most prominent dissenter from this alleged China consensus.”
“He doesn’t view President Xi [Jinping] in adversarial terms,” Wyne said. “He actually calls President Xi a ‘dear friend’ of his. And he believes that his personal rapport with President Xi will be the decisive dynamic in setting — or resetting — the U.S.-China relationship over the next four years.”
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