As the United States’ 2024 election cycle ends, the international community braces for “A spectre is haunting Europe—the spectre of communism.” This opening line from Karl Marx’s The Communist Manifesto resonates with renewed significance in the contemporary landscape, where the Russian state, as the ideological heir to the Soviet Union, employs a sophisticated array of soft power strategies. In the information age, Russia’s efforts to project influence globally reflect not just a revival of Soviet-era imperialism but also an adaptation to modern geopolitical dynamics, where informational warfare plays a crucial role.
At the heart of this Russian resurgence is Aleksandr Dugin’s seminal work, The Foundations of Geopolitics, published in 1997. Often regarded as a cornerstone of contemporary Russian geopolitical theory, Dugin’s text outlines a strategic vision for Russia aimed at regaining its influence as a dominant Eurasian power. He advocates for indirect strategies that prioritise non-military influence over traditional military interventions, emphasising the importance of culture, ideology, and information warfare in achieving geopolitical objectives.
The Russian government has increasingly embraced Dugin’s ideology, particularly its Eurasianist component, which seeks to forge closer ties with China. This partnership is not merely opportunistic; it is founded on the understanding that dyadic alliances that include dominant powers are more powerful and stable than multilateral agreements. Existing political science research supports this notion, suggesting that each member has a clear sense of responsibility and stakes in the partnership. In this context, Russia’s utilisation of soft power ontologically mimics China’s foreign policy initiatives, such as the Belt and Road Initiative. Remarkably, the diplomatic essence of Chinese international relations has expanded its influence across Asia, Europe, and beyond, while largely avoiding major conflicts since the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979.
In terms of expanding influence in neighbouring regions, Dugin’s ideas advocate for strategic partnerships with Western European nations, notably Germany, to forge a Berlin-Moscow axis that could effectively counterbalance US influence. This vision is no longer merely theoretical, evidenced by real political movements within Europe that align with Russian aims. For instance, political parties such as Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) and France’s National Rally have been linked to Russian financial support, signalling deliberate lobbying within Europe.
Another example falling under this paradigm is Russian involvement in the domestic affairs of other European countries such as Poland, considered in Dugin’s view as a part of the Berlin power bloc. The Polish Civic Platform Party’s policies and rhetoric centred around Russian interests so much that the government adopted the Lex Tusk law, which aims to create a commission that investigates Russian influence in Polish politics.
Furthermore, Russia has been accused of meddling in post-Soviet states’ elections. In Dugin’s view such control empowers the civilizational bloc forming around Moscow and its Soviet legacy. With that, during Georgia’s 2024 parliamentary elections, opposition leaders and international observers reported widespread allegations of vote manipulation, intimidation, and violence, all of which bear hallmarks of Russian-style interference. President Salome Zurabishvili criticised the ruling Georgian Dream party, accusing them of using “Russian methodologies” to manipulate the electoral process, including deploying administrative resources to influence outcomes and suppress dissent. Opposition groups have pointed to reports of voter intimidation and irregularities in vote counting, tactics commonly associated with Russian influence operations in the region. Furthermore, large protests erupted in response to claims of a rigged election, with demonstrators alleging that the ruling party’s actions were emboldened by Moscow’s backing.
In addition to the allegations of vote manipulation and intimidation in Georgia’s 2024 parliamentary elections, there is growing evidence of Russian involvement in spreading disinformation and supporting fraudulent activities. US and Georgian officials have raised concerns about coordinated efforts to influence public opinion and sway electoral outcomes through social media and other online platforms. According to reports, Russian operatives have been linked to a disinformation campaign aimed at destabilising Georgia’s democratic processes, including the dissemination of false narratives to create division within the electorate. The FBI has reportedly investigated instances where Russian-backed actors used fake accounts to spread divisive content, targeting Georgia’s electorate with misleading information.
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