The rapidly deteriorating strategic environment necessitates a shift in defence strategies and capabilities. The Australian Defence Force (ADF), like many military forces globally, must acknowledge that uncrewed systems will play an important role in future conflicts. It must accelerate its processes for developing their capability.
Russia’s war against Ukraine and fighting in the Red Sea have demonstrated a rapid proliferation of high volume, low-cost technologies that are now indispensable on the battlefield. In light of this, the ADF should further develop and implement strategies for uncrewed aerial systems (UASs) and counter-uncrewed aerial systems (C-UASs).
These strategies should provide clear guidelines on accelerating ADF access to UASs across air, land and sea; investments in and collaboration with the UAS industry; defining roles of civil and military authorities; and ways to counter drone threats.
The 2024 National Defence Strategy (NDS) and associated spending plan, the Integrated Investment Program, recognise the importance of enhancing Australia’s drone and counter-drone capabilities. The Defence Department does include UASs in ‘robotics, autonomous systems, and artificial intelligence’, one of its sovereign industrial capability priorities, but this covers only limited aspects of UASs, not the technology’s full breadth of capability and the need for large-scale manufacturing. Moreover, there is no evidence of recently developed or released strategies specifically addressing UASs and C-UASs.
By contrast, Australia’s allies, including the United States, Britain, France and South Korea, have already developed or revised their strategies. These are based in part on observations of the use of drones in Ukraine and understanding the need to protect against them. For example, the US released a C-UAS strategy in early December. Britain launched a new UAS strategy in February 2024 highlighting clear directions for enhancing UAS capabilities and for spending for the next decade. The ADF can similarly provide clear directions to accelerate access to UASs and C-UAS across air, land and sea by developing its own strategies.
The NDS calls for integrating existing and emerging technologies and for boosting military-industrial capacity with secure supply chains. The war in Ukraine has shown that a country needs to develop its own supply chain, manufacturing capabilities and stocks. The Australian industry is highly skilled and capable of doing this, but it needs direction through clear policy guidelines.
The ADF must recognise the need to balance between investing in complex, highly capable systems and high-volume, low-cost technologies that can provide quick and simple solutions for a range of security challenges.
The Integrated Investment Program includes spending on a range of uncrewed and autonomous systems. The ADF plans to spend more than $10 billion on drones, with at least $4.3 billion on uncrewed aerial systems and $690 million on uncrewed tactical systems for the army.
So far, Australia’s spending on UASs has focused on complex aircraft, such as the Boeing MQ-28A Ghost Bat, designed to operate alongside crewed aircraft or to independently increase aircraft numbers in combat. The air force has begun receiving MQ-4C Tritons, an unarmed, high-altitude and long-endurance uncrewed aircraft.
The ADF will spend more than $100 million on 110 drones from the Australian manufacturers SYPAQ and Quantum-Systems. While it considers the delivery of the limited number of systems in 2025 to express ‘an intent to enhance at speed’, other nations spend far more on ensuring that warfighters have such systems and, most importantly, are protected against them.
It must also acknowledge that UASs with high-end capabilities are highly vulnerable and must be protected. The conflict in Ukraine demonstrates that large UAS have become targets that are easy to detect and destroy. For example, TB2 Bayraktars, celebrated in 2022 for their performance, are no longer frequently used. Similarly, the Russian fleet has had to relocate from parts of the Black Sea due to drone threats, such as the one in November when Ukrainian drone boats motored over 1000km and blasted three Russian warships in one blow.
Furthermore, the government must better understand the relationship between civil and military authorities and their roles and responsibilities in counteracting UAS threats.
In peacetime, civil law enforcement agencies are responsible for defence against UAS, but responsibilities may overlap in relation to military installations and critical infrastructure. Moreover, civil agencies may require military support since only the armed forces have the equipment to detect, identify and engage UAS. The government must encourage close cooperation between civil and military organisations in order to maintain an effective level of interoperability.
Regardless of how the ADF develops its own UAS, it must prepare to defend against them. Every soldier must be aware of UAS threats, learn how to use a UAS, how to counter them for self-defence and to protect others and costly equipment. As UAS technologies evolve, so do C-UAS capabilities.
As evident from Russia’s war against Ukraine, the UAS are already threats, and they are here to stay. Australia must keep up with the rapid pace of innovation in this field. It needs to demonstrate commitment to stay ahead in the development of drone technology and ensure that its armed forces are prepared in the fast-changing security landscape.
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